There's lots of ways to address this question. There's actually mroe than one question here, I'll try addressing them all. A lot of modern (particularly physicalist) philosophers like to distinguish between mere will and 'free will'. For us to have a will, the cognitive faculties involved in decision making, etc., it need not be 'free', as the question of what it means to be 'free' is also a rather complicated one. It appears coherent to understand the human mind without mention of our will being 'free', whatever that may entail.
Most people think it's completely intuitive that we are free, and that any understanding of the human mind without freedom is lacking. That is a confused simplification though. For example, say you are sitting in your room, and you are hungry. You know there is a sandwich in the fridge (actually, it's enough for you to think there's a sandwich in the fridge, it doesn't actually have to be there), you like sandwiches, and you like this sort of sandwich. There's nothing else you are supposed to be doing. You're not tired, the phone isn't ringing or anything, windows shut and no other external stimuli catches your attention; my question is, to what extent can we call you 'free' when you 'freely' choose to go to the fridge to pick up and eat the sandwich?
Personally I like Kant's approach, where to act according to your freewill is to act in accordance with a rational judgment. The capacity to act irrationally or without rhyme or reason is not freedom, it's madness. Hell, the madman himself would be the first to tell you he is not free, but more often than not a captive of some neruo-chemical imbalance of one sort or another.
So here again there is a concept of 'free' which seems counterintuitive at first - Afterall, there is only one rational judgment, so if I am free, shouldn't I be free to choose? But upon this reading, that is not the case.
Before taking any position though, when we approach different philosophical stances, it's prudent to consider the pros and cons that follow from each position.
Certainly, "explaining away" free-will would be easier than actually explaining it, as it does not seem to mesh well with our current mechanical understanding of the universe, and the concept of 'freedom' itself seems almost unintelligible. However, giving up freewill has it's own dangerous consequences, particularly to the field ethics. It's not a knockdown argument, but there are good reasons to deny that morality has any place in a world without freewill.
With these consequences in mind, perhaps some sort of synthesis is where the truth lies, something like a Chaos-Theory understanding of how deterministic but nonlinear (and thus unpredictable to any fine detail) behaviour is possible in nature. Perhaps new discoveries in the scientific field of neurocognitive science will break new grounds in our understanding of what our will really is anyway.
or perhaps the real truth is simply beyond the scope of human science and understanding (a position sometimes called New Mysterianism I believe) .